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RUSSIAN ECONOMIC REPORT No.171 
 
After a decade of high growth, the Russian economy is experiencing a slowdown in the 
wake of the global financial crisis. While Russia’s strong short-term macroeconomic 
fundamentals make it better prepared than many emerging economies to deal with the 
crisis, its underlying structural weaknesses and high dependence on the price of a single 
commodity make its impact more pronounced than otherwise. Prudent fiscal management 
and substantial financial reserves have protected Russia from deeper consequences of 
this external shock. The government’s policy response so far—swift, comprehensive, and 
coordinated—has helped limit the impact. Short-term macroeconomic stabilization has to 
be the immediate priority as the authorities continue to adjust their short-term policy 
responses to changing economic circumstances. But the crisis also presents an 
opportunity to address the medium- to longer term challenges of competitiveness, 
economic diversification, and financial sector modernization which are necessary to 
boost growth and living standards. This would ensure that Russia emerges from this 
global crisis with a stronger basis for dynamic, productivity-led growth and is better 
placed to take advantage of global integration. 
 
 
1. RECENT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS 
 
Output and investment––starting to decelerate 
 
After a decade of high growth, the global financial crisis has affected Russia, posing a 
new challenge for macroeconomic policy. Having grown at an impressive 7 percent a 
year during 1999-2007––and at an overheating 8 percent in the first half of 2008––the 
Russian economy has started a gradual slowdown.  
 
Output growth––slowing 
 
In the first six months of 2008, real GDP growth in Russia continued at a brisk pace of 
about 8 percent, reflecting a booming economy and strong macroeconomic 
fundamentals (table 1.1). This growth exceeds the long-term potential of the economy 
(estimated in the 6-7 percent range), with clear signs of overheating. An upturn in 
inflation, a decline in unemployment, a rise in capital utilization, and real wages 
significantly outpacing productivity growth all indicated an overheating economy against 
the backdrop of binding supply (infrastructure) constraints.  
 
                                                 
1 Prepared by a World Bank team led by Zeljko Bogetic, Lead Economist for Russia and PREM Country 
Sector Coordinator. The team members were: Karlis Smits (Economist), Sergey Ulatov (Economist), 
Stepan Titov (Senior Economist), Olga Emelyanova (Research Analyst) and Marco Hernandez 
(Economist). Annete De Kleine contributed the box on the external environment.  Victor Sulla contributed 
the box on the poverty impact. 
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Russia’s strong macroeconomic fundamentals, prudent fiscal policy, and lack of 
exposure to the US sub-prime crisis have partially protected its economy and helped 
limit the impact of the global financial crisis. Thanks to low sovereign external debt, 
large twin surpluses (fiscal and external current account), one of the world’s largest 
international reserves, and favorable rating agency assessments, until mid-2008, foreign 
investors viewed Russia as a “safe heaven,” fairly “decoupled” from worsening global 
financial environment. By building significant fiscal and reserve cushions relative to most 
other emerging markets, Russia has also managed to delay and limit the impact of the 
global crisis. In fact, it is now clear that if Russia had not entered the current global 
financial crisis with such a strong fiscal surplus and large resources accumulated in the 
stabilization funds and foreign reserves, the impact of the crisis would have been much 
quicker and more severe than is currently the case. Equally important, the government 
would have had much less time, resources, policy options and room for maneuvering to 
limit the impact of the crisis on the real economy. 
 
Table 1.1:  Main macroeconomic indicators, 2003-08 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008Q1-3 
GDP growth, %   7.3 7.2 6.4 7.4 8.1 8a 
Industrial production growth, y-o-y, %  8.9 8 5.1 6.3 6.3 5.4 
Fixed capital investment growth, %, y-o-y  12.5 13.7 10.9 16.7 21.1 13.1 
Federal government balance, % GDP 1.7 4.3 7.5 7.4 5.5 8.1 
Inflation (CPI), % change , e-o-p 12 11.7 10.9 9 11.9 11.6b 
Current account, billion USD 35.4 58.6 84.2 95.6 76.6 91.2 
Unemployment, % 8.6 8.2 7.6 7.2 6.1 5.3 
Reserves (including gold) billion USD, e-o-p 76.9 124.5 182.2 303.7 478.8 475c 
a. data for 2008Q1-2. 
b. data for 10 months. 
c. data as of November 7, 2008. 
Source: Rosstat, CBR, Ministry of Finance. 
 
 
Box 1.1. A worsening international environment 
 
Total gross capital flows to emerging markets plummeted in the third quarter of 2008 and world 
economic activity has decelerated markedly in recent months with further slowdown projected in 2009. 
Compared with the same period of 2007, they went down 36 percent, posting the lowest volumes since 
2004. All segments were hit, with equity inflows falling to the lowest level since 2002. Bond and equity 
issuance fell off sharply, while bank lending remained more resilient, averaging USD26 billion a month. 
Year-to-date flows to Latin America have halved. Those in Asia—the region with strongest macro and 
financial sector fundamentals—eased moderately. Total gross capital flows to Russia declined to USD75 
billion in 2008Q3, down 40 percent from the same period in 2007. As flows to emerging markets declined, 
bond spreads widened markedly, reaching the highest levels since 2004. At the same time, world economic 
activity is slowing down significantly. The world economic output is to increase by only 0.93 percent in 
2009 and by 3.01 percent in 2010. Economic growth in developing (low- and middle-income) countries is 
expected to be around 4.45 percent in 2009 and 6.06 percent in 2010. However, high-income countries are 
facing a growth decline to only 0.15 percent in 2009 and a moderate recovery to 2.04 percent in 2010. 
Many factors led to the fall-off in activity, as consumers and businesses alike are being squeezed by tighter 
credit conditions and rising inflationary pressures, in addition to marked deterioration in business and 
consumer confidence. In many countries, negative wealth effects from falling asset prices are contributing 
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to the slowdown. Potential negative feedbacks from the recent severe financial market turmoil point to a 
deepening of the current downturn and sharp downside risks. 
 
Box figure 1. Oil price forecast and capital flows to emerging markets 
World Bank oil price forecast: Average crude 
(Brent, Dubai and WTI), simple average, USD/bbl 
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Crude oil prices fell dramatically from USD144 a barrel to below USD55 a barrel in mid-November. The 
slump was due to sharply declining demand in the United States and Europe, and expectations of slowing 
demand in developing countries as the global economy slows. Non-OPEC supplies are also set to jump in 
the fourth quarter and in 2009, which should result in higher stocks. Inventories remain relatively low given 
disruptions from the Caspian region, Nigeria, and the US Gulf of Mexico. OPEC meets on December 17, 
but it is unknown to what extent the organization may step in to support prices. Despite setbacks, increases 
in non-OPEC supplies are expected in the next few years, and investments are under way to add capacity in 
all OPEC countries. This is expected to contribute to a decline in the current official World Bank’s average 
crude price forecast from an annual average of USD101.17 a barrel in 2008 to USD75.80 a barrel in 2010. 
 
Four major related shocks appear to have transmitted the global crisis to Russia:  
• First, the intensification of the global crisis caused a sudden stop and then a 
reversal in capital flows as investors fled to quality across world markets, 
Russia included. 
• Second, the global credit crunch has affected Russia’s banking system, which 
faces its own liquidity problems against short-term external repayment 
obligations.  
• Third, a sharp drop in the price of oil began to erode Russia’s fiscal and 
external account surpluses and very large international reserve buffer.  
• Fourth, Russia’s stock market experienced a massive decline––largely 
reflecting the global loss of confidence and the precipitous drop in the price of 
oil––losing two-thirds of its value in the less than five months to mid-
November 2008.  
 
These shocks are slowing domestic demand––hitherto the engine of Russia’s growth––
posing new policy challenges in a dramatically different external and domestic 
environment from just a few months ago. The main policy challenge now is to limit the 
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inevitable impact of the crisis on the real economy while safeguarding hard-won gains in 
macroeconomic, especially fiscal stability. 
 
Specifically, since July 2008, the rapidly worsening global financial crisis and the 
declining oil prices have dramatically altered the international economic outlook, 
cooling the Russian economy. And since July 3, 2008, when the oil prices reached the 
historic peaks of USD144.07 per barrel (Brent crude) —USD139.52 Ural— respectively, 
there have been early signs of cooling off, initially due to increasing capacity constraints, 
higher factor costs, and real appreciation of the currency. But the worsening of global 
demand and the associated decline in oil prices accelerated the slowdown, which is 
expected to be felt strongly in the last quarter of 2008 (box 1.1). 
 
On the supply side, tradable sectors were the first to register slower growth, but 
nontradables are also slowing from very high growth rates. The rapid increase in wages, 
outpacing productivity growth, and the appreciation of the currency continued to 
undermine the competitiveness of tradables. Tradables grew by 3.4 percent in the second 
quarter of 2008, down from 5.2 percent in the first quarter of 2008 (table 1.2). By 
contrast, nontradables expanded by 9.5 percent in the first half of 2008, driven by a 
strong consumer demand in construction and retail trade. Even the booming construction 
sector growth slowed to (a still high) 18.7 percent in the second quarter of 2008, from 
28.3 percent in the previous quarter. And there are signs that growth in construction will 
continue to decelerate sharply with the ongoing tightening of credit conditions. The most 
recent data on production growth in the main sectors indicate a continuing sharp decline 
in construction growth during the third quarter of the year––only 9.5 percent, down from 
15.7 percent during the same period in 2007. 
 
Table 1.2.  GDP growth by main sectors, 2003–08 (value added) 
GDP growth 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Q1 
2008 
Q2 
Total GDP growth   7.3 7.2 6.4 7.4 8.1 8.5 7.5 
Tradable sectors 8.9  6.3  3.5  2.6  4.6  5.2 3.4 
Agriculture, forestry  5.5 3.0 1.1 3.6 3.1 3.2 3.2 
Extraction industries 10.8 7.9 0.5 1.6 0.3 1.5 -1.0 
Manufacturing 9.5 6.7 6.0 2.9 7.4 7.6 5.6 
Nontradable sectors 7.2  7.3  7.3  9.8  9.8  9.9 9.1 
Electricity, gas, water 
production and distribution 
1.6 2.0 1.2 4.7 -1.9 5.3 1.7 
Construction 13.0 10.3 10.5 11.6 16.4 28.3 18.7 
Wholesale and retail trade 13.2 9.2 9.4 14.6 12.9 11.9 11.7 
Financial services  9.6 9.9 11.9 10.3 11.4 9.7 9.7 
Transport and communication  7.2 10.9 6.2 9.6 7.7 9.8 9.4 
Source: Rosstat; World Bank staff calculations. 
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Manufacturing—the engine of Russia’s industrial growth—did well through 
September 2008, but a slowdown is likely in the last quarter. The most recent data based 
on production indices show that manufacturing grew by 8.2 percent year-on-year in 
September 2008, mainly driven by growth in production of water turbines (97.3 percent 
year-on-year), tractors (74 percent year-on-year), passenger cars (28.4 percent year-on-
year), and pipes (26.1 percent year-on-year). In the first three quarters of 2008, 
manufacturing grew 7.7 percent, compared with 7.8 percent in the same period in 2007. 
The growth momentum in manufacturing is partly a result of past orders, mainly by state-
owned enterprises. But with credit tightening in the fourth quarter, manufacturing will 
also likely feel a drop in demand, with attendant impacts on production. 
 
Looking ahead, the weakening of global financial conditions and the sharp fall in oil 
prices in the third and fourth quarters of 2008 is expected to accelerate the economic 
slowdown. The financial turmoil has already increased borrowing costs, adversely 
affected liquidity and credit, and dampened the aggregate demand, thus affecting 
consumption and investment. This is expected to accelerate in the fourth quarter, 
especially in the most finance-sensitive sectors, such as construction and retail trade.  
 
Domestic demand—a key engine of Russia’s short-term growth—weakening 
 
The deceleration of investment growth in the first half of 2008 has marked the 
beginning of a gradual slowdown in aggregate demand, with consumption following 
suit (figure 1.1). Following the boom in the first quarter of 2008, investment––with 
consumption, the main driver of short-term growth––increased by 19.1 percent (year-on-
year) but then slowed to 13.0 percent in the second quarter and to 9.9 percent in the third 
quarter (table 1.3). This slowdown was largely due to state corporations and to extraction 
industries, which reported a sharp drop in investment growth to only 6.2 percent in the 
first half of 2008 (year-on-year), down from 19.1 percent in 2007. Supply constraints and 
a gradual rise in global uncertainties and associated changes in investment sentiments, 
international and domestic, likely played a role in these developments. With heightened 
uncertainties, investors everywhere shortened their time horizons and revisited or delayed 
costly long-term investments. As a result, foreign direct investments have slowed. Total 
investment-to-GDP remains at about 22 percent, lower than that of the fast-growing 
Asian economies. In addition, tighter credit conditions and rising uncertainty and weak 
labor market outlook has adversely affected consumption growth (figure 1.1). 
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Figure 1.1. Demand sources of Russia’s real GDP growth by quarter, 2007-2008 
(percentage change) 
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Source: World Bank decomposition and estimates based on Rosstat data. 
* World Bank staff projected estimate. 
 
Table 1.3.  Fixed capital investments, 2005-08, year-on-year growth rates, and 
shares 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 
Fixed capital investment 
growth, % 
10.9 16.7 21.1 19.1 13 9.9 
Gross fixed capital formation 
growth, %  
10.6 17.7 20.8 19.4 12.9 n/a 
Share of gross fixed capital 
formation,  % of GDP 
17.7 18.5 21.1 15.6 20.1 n/a 
  Consolidated budgetary 
investments, % of GDP 
2.8 2.9 3.2 1.2 2.3 n/a 
  n/a = not available.  
Source: Rosstat.  
 
More worrisome for the long term is that investment is heavily concentrated in a few, 
mainly nontradable sectors. Nontradables account for two-thirds of fixed capital 
investment, reflecting the overall pattern of growth (table 1.4). A more detailed sectoral 
decomposition of investment shows that the bulk remains concentrated in resource 
extraction and in the transport and communication category, out of which pipeline 
transport accounted for a significant part. Investment growth in the tradable sectors 
slowed to 8.1 percent in the first half of 2008, from 16.1 percent in 2007. Among non-
tradables, fixed capital investment in retail trade has begun to decline dramatically, 
mainly due to tighter credit. There was one bright spot, however: fixed capital investment 
in railways increased by 49.3 percent in the first half of 2008, perhaps thanks to large, 
past orders of locomotives, passenger cars, and freight cars.  
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Table 1.4. Sectoral structure of fixed capital investments, 2005-08  
(percentage of total, unless otherwise indicated)  
  2005 2006 2007 Growth 
rates, 2007, 
year-on-year 
Growth 
rates, 6M 
2008, y-o-y 
Tradable sector 36 37.1 37.3 16.1 8.1 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 3.2 4.0 4.3 25.2 7.1 
Extraction of mineral resources 15.2 17.0 17.3 19.1 6.2 
Manufacturing 17.6 16.1 15.7 10.8 10.6 
Food industry, including 
beverages, tobacco production 3.1 2.8 2.8 10.4 -6.6 
Coke and oil products 1.8 1.6 1.6 4.4 19.2 
Machine building  0.5 0.6 0.7 12.0 -23.9 
Transportation devices 1.0 1.0 1.2 38.6 43.8 
Chemical products 1.7 1.8 1.7 4.8 12.7 
Other non-metal mineral 
products 1.5 1.2 1.6 45.5 59.0 
Metallurgy and metal products 4.7 4.1 3.6 –2.0 15.3 
Nontradable sector 64 62.9 62.7 14.2 15.4 
Electricity, gas, and water 
production and distribution 7.8 7.6 8.7 30.0 15.0 
Construction 2.9 3.0 2.4 5.1 35.4 
Retail and wholesale trade, 
maintenance of vehicles, home 
appliances 
2.8 3.1 2.9 12.8 -9.5 
Transport and communication 28.8 25.5 25.3 8.2 14.4 
Railways 6.4 3.7 4.3 16.6 49.3 
Pipelines 7.7 8.5 7.0 –8.4 -7.2 
Communication 6.7 5.3 5.1 2.6 8.5 
Real estate operations, leasing, 
and services provision 11.5 12.0 12.0 18.3 15.8 
Health care and social services 2.3 2.7 2.6 15.2 18.1 
Provision of other public 
utilities, social and personal 
services 
2.6 2.8 2.7 11.7 13.4 
Source: Rosstat and World Bank staff calculations. 
 
Labor markets—still tight but likely to soften  
 
Real wages continue to outpace productivity growth, undermining competitiveness, but 
wage growth has begun to moderate while unemployment—a lagging indicator to real 
economic activity––has declined further. According to Rosstat, in the first nine months 
of 2008 average real wage growth was 12.8 percent, down from 16.2 percent during the 
 
 
World Bank Russia Country Office                                                                                           Economic Management and Policy Unit 
 
8/45 
same period in 2007 (figure 1.2, table 1.5). Unemployment declined to 5.3 percent, 
indicating that the economic slowdown has not yet reached the labor market. But this is 
expected to change by year end as large, non-tradable and labor-intensive sectors such as 
construction and trade delay the execution of existing and new projects and adjust to 
higher borrowing costs, more difficult access to credit, uncertain demand, therefore, and 
lower profit margins. Similarly, the ongoing restructuring in the banking sector is 
expected to increase the number of unemployed.  
 
Figure 1.2. Labor productivity and real wage growth, 2005-2008 (in percentages) 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
2005 2006 2007 2008*
Labor productivity growth, % Real wage growth, %  
Source: Rosstat and World Bank staff estimates. 
* Labor productivity growth Jan-June 2008, the real wage growth Jan-September 2008. 
Note: Labor productivity calculated as output (GDP) per employed person. 
 
Table 1.5. Incomes and unemployment, 2003-08 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 9m-2007 9m-2008 
Real disposable 
income growth, % 14.9 9.9 8.8 10.2 10.7 10.4 7.8 
Real wage growth, %  10.9 10.6 10 13.4 16.2 16.2 12.8 
Average monthly 
wage, USD 179.4 237.2 301.6 394.7 529.0 495.0 693.0 
Unemployment (%, 
ILO definition) 8.6 8.2 7.6 7.1 6.1 5.6 5.3 
Source: Rosstat. 
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External sector: balance of payments, foreign direct investment, and debt 
 
Reversal in capital flows and a drop in oil prices—deteriorating external outlook 
 
In the nine months of 2008, Russia began to experience a globally incited “sudden 
stop” and a reversal of capital flows, followed by a rapid fall in oil prices—but the 
current account has held well. Despite rapid import growth driven by strong domestic 
demand, trade and the overall external current account continued to improve on the back 
of record high oil prices (figure 1.3). The fall in oil prices will significantly affect the 
trade and external current accounts only in the fourth quarter of 2008, when export 
deliveries based on past lower oil price will take place. More worrisome, however, is that 
the nonoil external current account continues to deteriorate quickly in 2008 as import 
volumes grow considerably faster than nonoil exports (figure 1.4). In the second quarter 
of 2008, the nonoil external current account deficit sharply increased to almost USD60 
billion, and further to USD62 billion in the third quarter, making Russia’s balance of 
payments position particularly vulnerable to a sudden drop in oil and gas prices.  
 
Figure 1.3. Oil prices and the trade balance  
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Figure 1.4. Current account balances and the real effective exchange rate 
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After record inflows in 2007, Russia has experienced a sudden reversal in capital 
inflows since mid-year. After reaching a peak USD84.3 billion in 2007, the surplus of the 
capital account for the first three quarters of 2008 was only USD0.5 billion, compared to 
USD59.3 billion in the same period of 2007, reflecting mainly a sudden reversal in 
capital inflows in the third quarter of 2008. An outflow of capital is also reflected in a 
slower accumulation of official reserves in the first three quarters of 2008 compared with 
the same period in 2007, despite a much stronger external current account in 2008 (table 
1.6). Two main factors were behind the deterioration of the capital account. First, 
changes in investment sentiment triggered a reversal of capital flows, including short-
term speculative flows and FDI. Second, changes in foreign exchange expectations 
resulted in the unwinding of ruble positions held by foreign investors betting on a 
continuing ruble appreciation.  
 
Table 1.6. Balance of payments (USD billions), 2004-08 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 Q1-3-2007 Q1-3-2008 a
Current Account Balance 58.6 83.8 94.5 78.3 52.3 91.2 
Trade Balance 85.8 118.4 139.2 132 91 153.3 
Capital and Financial 
Account -6.3 -13.6 11.9 84.3 59.3 0.5 
Errors and Omissions -7.1 -8.8 1.1 -13.6 -5.2 -5.8 
Change in Reserves (+ = 
increase) 45.2 61.5 107.5 148.9 106.4 85.9 
Source: CBR. 
a Preliminary estimates. 
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In 2008, capital flows became more volatile, and the banking sector experienced a 
sharp reversal of capital inflows (figure 1.5). The structure of the Russian capital 
account shows a sudden reversal of private capital inflows, especially in the banking 
sector. In the first quarter of 2008, total net capital outflows amounted to USD23.2 
billion, followed by inflows of USD40.7 billion in the second quarter, and outflows of 
USD16.7 billion in the third quarter of 2008 (table 1.7). During the first two quarters of 
2008, the banks contributed about half of total net capital flows, and in the third quarter, 
almost the full amount of capital outflows.  
 
Figure 1.5. Quarterly net capital flows in USD billion, 2007–2008 
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Source: CBR. 
 
Table 1.7.  Net capital flows (USD billions), 2003-08 
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Q1-3-
2007a 
Q1-3-
2008a 
Total net capital inflows 
to the private sector 
-1.9 -8.9 0.1 41.9 81.2 61.4 0.8 
       Net capital inflows 
to the banking sector 
10.3 3.5 5.9 27.5 45.9 33.5 -3.5 
       Net capital inflows 
to the non-banking 
sector 
-12.2 -12.4 -5.8 14.4 35.4 27.9 4.3 
a. Since the beginning of year. 
Source: CBR. 
 
Foreign direct investment—non-debt-creating capital flows that can also bring new 
technology and knowhow—registered a decline due to changes in domestic laws and 
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investor sentiment. The fall in FDI in 2008 is mainly due to a drop of FDI in extraction 
industries, accounting for about half of FDI in 2007. According to Rosstat, FDI flows in 
extraction industries were only USD2.5 billion in the first half of 2008, down from 
USD13.9 billion for all 2007. This is due to a combination of gradual worsening of the 
investment sentiment and policy steps aimed at increasing state control in sectors of 
strategic importance. Although the new law “on the practice of implementation of foreign 
investment in companies which have strategic importance for ensuring defense and 
security of the state,” adopted on April 29, 2008 clearly defines rules of the game and 
brings more transparency, it also considerably limits foreign participation in resource 
extraction industries, something that has incited concern by some foreign investors. So, in 
terms of the environment for foreign participation, there appears to have been a clear shift 
away from extractive industries and toward the recently liberalized electricity sector 
(table 1.8). 
 
Table 1.8. Shares of foreign direct investment, by sector, 2005-08 (percent of total)  
  2005 2006 2007 2008 H1 
Tradable sector-total 77.7 53.5 65.7 37.4 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry 0.9 1.4 0.8 1.7 
Extraction industries 30.7 33.1 50.1 22.6 
Manufacturing 46.1 19.0 14.8 13.1 
Non-tradable sector-total 22.3 46.5 34.3 62.6 
Electricity, gas, and water production 
and distribution 
1.1 0.4 0.5 33.9 
Construction 0.9 2 3.2 5.3 
Retail and wholesale trade, 
maintenance of vehicles, home 
appliances 
5.9 6.1 11.7 8.0 
Hotels and restaurants 0.2 0.2 0.2 n/a 
Transport and communication 1.9 2.8 2.1 1.5 
Finance 4.5 11 4.0 1.3 
Real estate operations, leasing, and 
services provision 
7.1 23.5 11.8 11.9 
Provision of other public utilities, 
social and personal services 
0.6 0.4 0.5 0.5 
Source: Rosstat and World Bank staff calculations. 
 
The decline in FDI was partly offset by greater reliance on external borrowing. 
Replacing FDI with debt financing makes Russia more vulnerable to sudden changes in 
investor confidence or changes in external market conditions. After recording more than 
USD27.8 billion in FDI in 2007, FDI flows in Russia fell by about USD11.1 billion in the 
first half of 2008. Total debt flows increased from USD53.4 billion in 2006 to USD152.9 
billion in 2007 but then decreased to USD63.6 billion in 2008. As a share of total capital 
flows, they increased from 77 percent in 2005 to 85.2 percent in the first half of 2008 
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(table 1.9). If this trend continues, capital account would become even more vulnerable to 
changes in investor confidence and borrowing and refinancing conditions.  
 
Table 1.9. Foreign direct investment and debt flows, 2005-08 (USD billions) 
  2005 2006 2007 H1 - 2008  
FDI inflows 13.1 13.7 27.8 11.1 
External debt stock 257.2 310.6 463.5 527.1 
External debt flows 43.7 53.4 152.9 63.6 
Total capital flows 57.7 67.1 180.7 74.7 
Share of debt flows as a percent of total 
capital inflows 77.0% 79.6% 84.6% 85.2% 
 Source: Rosstat; CBR. 
 
External public and corporate and banking debt continue growing fast 
 
Russia’s private corporate and banking debt grew rapidly in the first half of 2008 and 
total external debt rose by USD50.1 billion in the second quarter of 2008. Although the 
general government’s external debt remains modest, the private corporate and banking 
debt increased by USD37.8 billion in the second quarter of 2008. The corporate sector—
officially classified as “private” but including such state-controlled enterprises as 
Gazprom—accounts for most of the debt stock (figure 1.6). In the corporate sector, both 
financial and nonfinancial institutions have increased their debt stock, but nonfinancial 
institutions have increased it more rapidly. Public external debt has moderated.  
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Figure 1.6. Russian total external debt stock (USD billions) 
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Sources: CBR and World Bank staff calculations. 
 
Banking––rollover risk sharply rising and consolidation starting 
 
While the overall share of short-term external debt of Russia remains low, accounting 
for less than 20 percent of total external debt, the share of short-term debt in private 
financial institutions is significantly higher at around 40 percent (table 1.10). High 
levels of short-term debt make these private financial institutions, predominantly small 
and medium-size banks that were able to tap into international capital markets funding, 
vulnerable to the rollover risk and sudden changes in investment sentiment. Many banks 
relying on external borrowing must revisit their funding model under conditions of abrupt 
difficulties in access to new external credit and sharply rising rollover risk. For banks 
already relying on a broad deposit base, this may be easier to accomplish. Others, relying 
more on wholesale models and few and potentially volatile corporate clients, might need 
to seek additional sources of capital and reorient their funding model toward traditional 
retail banking. As a result, bank consolidation has been restarted with several banks being 
taken over by other, stronger banks or the government. Given the fragmented Russian 
banking system and the large number of small banks, orderly consolidation could 
contribute to a stronger and healthier banking sector emerging after the crisis. 
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Table 1.10: Russia’s external debt (USD billions) 
 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 
 Total of which 
short term 
Short-
term: 
share of 
total 
Total of which 
short 
term 
Short-
term: 
share of 
total 
Public sector-total 182.9 16.9 9.24% 195.3 18.5 9.47% 
.. o/w general government 36.9 1.6 4.34% 34.7 1.6 4.61% 
.. o/w monetary Authorities 4.1 4.1 100.00% 4.2 4.2 100.00% 
..o/w public financial 
corporations (banks) 
67.4 11.2 16.62% 78.2 11.9 15.22% 
..o/w public non-financial 
sector 
74.5 0 0.00% 78.2 0.8 1.02% 
Private sector-total 294.1 76.5 26.01% 331.9 84.6 25.49% 
..o/w private financial 
corporations 
104 44.6 42.88% 114.6 48.6 42.41% 
..o/w private non-financial 
corporations 
190.1 31.9 16.78% 217.3 36 16.57% 
Aggregate 477 93.4 19.58% 527.1 103.1 19.56% 
Source: CBR, World Bank staff calculations. 
 
With hefty repayment obligations at a time of sharply tighter global credit, the rollover 
risk has risen, but the systemic risk is limited. Russia’s external debt maturing in the 
third and fourth quarters of 2008 is around USD100 billion, of which about USD45 
billion is due in the last quarter of 2008. After including on-demand deposits held by the 
banking sector, the total debt that requires repayment or refinancing exceeds USD120 
billion (figure 1.7). The external debt maturing for the entire 2009 fiscal year is slightly 
less, around USD100 billion, however. Certain sectors, especially private financial 
corporations, are likely to face challenges in rolling over their external debt. In addition, 
higher prices for debt refinancing are inevitable. Furthermore, a sharp drop in stock 
values that were used as loan collateral have resulted in sizeable margin calls on lending 
facilities with 1-2 year maturities. It is estimated that the total debt due in the fourth 
quarter of 2008 including the margin calls might, therefore, amount to about USD60-65 
billion. Even so, systemic risk to the banking sector, while rising, appears limited because 
of the government’s resolve to support the systemically important banks and a sizable 
package of measures taken to date (see part II of this RER below on the impact of the 
crisis and policy measures). A recent IMF mission has also concluded that the systemic 
risk remains limited (see IMF’s Press Release No. 08/225 of September 26, 2008). 
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Figure 1.7. Repayment schedule of Russia’s external debt (in USD billion) 
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Source: CBR. 
 
Monetary-exchange policy and inflation––risk shifting towards liquidity 
 
The central bank has gradually begun to change its policy of exchange rate switching 
towards inflation targeting, making the exchange rate more flexible. These policy steps 
included tightening monetary policy gradually since the beginning of the year and 
increasing reserve requirements and interest rates. In the event, there was a considerable 
slowdown of money supply growth in the first nine months of 2008 (8.3 percent), 
compared with the same period in 2007 (27.8 percent), largely because of a reversal of 
capital flows and slower reserve accumulation by the Central Bank of Russia. Yet, the 
gradual tightening of money was not sufficient to engineer a decline in inflation, which 
remains high on the back of high inflation expectations and high aggregate demand 
(figure 1.8).  
 
But with liquidity risks rising sharply, the central bank moved decisively to support 
liquidity in the system and help restore confidence during the September liquidity 
crunch. Dramatic worsening of global financial conditions in the third quarter of 2008 
and the liquidity crisis in September caused the central bank to change the policy course 
and provide substantial liquidity in its efforts to alleviate the confidence crisis and 
unfreeze the interbank credit market. These actions were swift, appropriate, and 
proportionate to the problem at hand. And they helped to temporarily stabilize the 
financial markets after the tumultuous week of 15-19 September. An estimated 400 
billion rubles of additional liquidity (USD15 billion or 1.2 percent of GDP) were pumped 
into the economy in September and October, when the reserve requirements were 
dropped sharply to 0.5 percent. This temporarily alleviated the sharp liquidity and 
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confidence crisis in mid-September, but liquidity pressures continued later in October and 
prompted the government to take additional measures to ensure the rollover of external 
obligations by banks and corporations (see part II of this RER below). In hindsight, this 
was the right decision, helping avoid more difficult liquidity conditions in September and 
early October than otherwise. 
 
Figure 1.8. Monetary growth and inflation  
(in percent; monetary growth-left scale; inflation-right scale) 
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Source: CBR; Rosstat; World Bank calculations 
Note: 2008 data are as of September. 
 
Inflationary expectations, higher import prices, combined with loose monetary and 
fiscal policy in 2007 and early in 2008 have resulted in an upturn in CPI inflation, 
which reached 11.6 percent in the first ten months of 2008 (table 1.11). But with the 
slowdown of economic growth and aggregate demand, inflationary pressures should 
gradually decrease. Yet, given the injection of liquidity, it is unlikely that the 
government’s inflation target of 11.8 percent for 2008 will be met, despite the economic 
slowdown and the fall in food prices (figure 1.8 and 1.9). In the most recent monetary 
policy statements, the CBR has revised the year-end CPI inflation target to 13 percent.  
 
Table 1.11. CPI, inflation, and money growth  
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 9m-07 9m-08 10m-08 
CPI inflation, % 12 11.7 10.9 9 11.9 7.5 10.6 11.6 
Core CPI Inflation, %, to 
Dec of the previous year 
11.2 10.5 8.3 7.8 11 6.6 10.1 11.6 
PPI inflation, % to Dec of 
the previous year 
12.5 28.8 13.4 10.4 25.1 17 17.6 n/a 
M2 growth, % 50.5 35.8 38.5 48.8 47.5 27.8 8.3 n/a 
Source: Rosstat. 
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Figure 1.9. CPI inflation and food prices (year-on-year) 
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Fiscal policy and fiscal developments––aiming to limit the impact of the crisis 
 
Russia’s consolidated (general) budget was executed with the strong surplus of 11.1 
percent of GDP in the first nine months of 2008, compared with 9.4 percent for the 
same period in 2007 (table 1.12). The difference is largely explained by higher revenue 
collections associated with record-high oil prices. The fiscal balance of the consolidated 
(general) budget marginally improved in the first nine months of 2008, compared with 
the corresponding period of the previous year. However, according to preliminary data 
from the Ministry of Finance, the consolidated non-oil balance amounted to -0.2 percent 
of GDP, compared with about 0.7 percent surplus last year. Given the seasonality in 
expenditures, a sharp fall in oil and gas prices—and the recently announced increases in 
government spending to weather the impact of the global financial crisis—the fiscal 
position is expected to deteriorate toward year-end, with the non-oil deficit possibly 
exceeding the last year’s -2.9 percent of GDP. Given the balance of risks that has shifted 
dramatically toward growth, the financial sector, and the real economy, there might be a 
case for such a temporary shift. Long-term, public expenditures will clearly need to 
adjust, however, to keep the overall fiscal balance on a long-term sustainable path in case 
of prolonged periods of very low international prices of oil and weak global demand (see 
part II of the previous Russian Economic Report #16 on issues of fiscal sustainability at 
www.worldbank.org/russia).  
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Table 1.12.  Consolidated budget: revenues, expenditures, and the fiscal surplus, 
2005-08 
  2005 2006 2007 9m-2008 
Revenues, % GDP 39.7 39.6 40.2 39.5 
Expenditure, % GDP 31.5 31.2 34.1 28.3 
Surplus, % GDP 8.1 8.4 6.1 11.1 
Non-oil balance, % GDP -2.1 -2.8 -2.9 -0.2 
Primary non-oil balance, % 
GDP -1 -2 -2.3 0.3 
 Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
The State Duma approved in the second reading the draft Law “On the federal budget 
2009 and planned period of 2010 and 2011,” submitted by the federal government at 
the end of August, and then amended expenditures on the third reading to deal with 
the financial crisis. The approved budget plan envisages a gradual decline in fiscal 
revenues associated with lower oil prices and notable reduction in federal spending as a 
percentage of GDP by 2011 (table 1.13). On 23 October, the State Duma approved in the 
second and third readings the Federal Law "On the federal budget for 2008 and planned 
period of 2009 and 2010." The revised law envisages an increase in government spending 
by 172.3 billion rubles in 2008 (about USD6.4 billion or 2.3 percent of total federal 
expenditures), which partly will be financed by redistributing expenditures from 2009 
(16.1 billion rubles) and by "borrowing" from investment funds (114.3 billion rubles). 
Almost half of this amount (75 billion rubles or about USD3 billion) will be used to 
capitalize Vnesheconombank as an additional measure to support the financial system. 
And some 60 billion rubles (about USD2.4 billion) will be used for capitalizing the 
Agency for Housing Financing to support the mortgage market.  
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Table 1.13. Three-year plan for federal budget, 2009-11 (in percent of GDP) 
 2009 2010 2011 
Revenues 21.2 19.8 19 
..oil and gas revenues 9.1 7.7 6.9 
Expenditures 17.5 17.4 16.7 
  General state management  w/o   
  interest expenditure 
2.2 1.7 1.3 
  National defense  2.5 2.4 2.2 
  National security, law enforcement 2.1 2 1.9 
  National economy 2 2 2 
  Housing and communal services   0.2 0.2 0.2 
  Education 0.8 0.8 0.7 
  Culture, mass media 0.2 0.2 0.2 
  Health and sport 0.7 0.6 0.6 
  Social policy 0.6 0.6 0.5 
  Inter-budgetary transfers 5.8 6.1 5.9 
Transfers to extra-budgetary funds 3.4 4.1 4.1 
Total non-interest expenditure 17.1 17 16.2 
Interest payments 0.4 0.4 0.5 
Oil and gas transfer  4.9 4.5 3.7 
Surplus/deficit 3.7 2.4 2.3 
Non-oil surplus/deficit -5.4 -5.3 -4.6 
 Source: Ministry of Finance. 
 
The approved amendments also stipulate the possibility for the government to use 200 
billion rubles for further capitalization of the Deposit Insurance Agency—using the 
residual budget funds normally used to cover gaps in cash budget execution—as well as 
175 billion rubles for implementing measures to support financial markets and industrial 
sector.  
 
While the proposed budget indicates a loosening of the fiscal policy stance, this might 
be appropriate as a temporary policy response. Temporary loosening, if implemented 
swiftly with clear results on the confidence front, might limit the impact of the crisis on 
the economy while maintaining flexibility for later tightening to support future 
disinflation. In general, counter-cyclical fiscal policy has a better chance of affecting the 
real economy when there is a sizeable fiscal surplus, as in Russia, as opposed to when 
additional public debt might risk aggravating the underlying fiscal problems.  
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Policy challenges going forward 
 
Russia’s first challenge is to limit the overall impact of the crisis on liquidity and the 
real economy while not losing control of the public finances and not letting inflation 
get out of control. This will be a delicate balancing act. But Russia is better prepared 
today to deal with these new challenges than at any time since the beginning of the 
transition. Despite some similarities with the crisis triggers of 1998, Russia today is a 
much larger economy with much stronger macroeconomic fundamentals. Prudent fiscal 
policy over the last decade has permitted accumulating international reserves of USD475 
billion (November 7, 2008), a fiscal surplus around 8.1 percent (January-September 
2008), a ratio of external short-term debt to total international reserves of around 0.18 
(2008 Q2), and a fairly low overall external debt of 35.9 percent of GDP. Thus, despite 
the evolving liquidity and stock market crisis, Russia is better positioned to withstand the 
situation than other emerging economies, and its policy response so far has been swift, 
massive, and broadly appropriate. 
 
The second challenge is to intensify the efforts to diversify the economy, strengthen 
institutions as well as the financial sector for sustained, long-term growth. Oil and gas 
exports continue to account for more than two-thirds of Russia’s export revenue and 
more than 15 percent of GDP. But the crisis shows how dependent the Russian economy 
is on oil prices and how much it needs to diversify and strengthen its financial sector for 
sustained, long-term growth. Despite strong macroeconomic fundamentals, structural 
weaknesses in the banking sector and a limited economic base make Russia vulnerable to 
highly correlated, multiple shocks of a decline in oil price, a sudden reversal in capital 
flows, and a drop in the market sentiment and the stock market. Russia’s economic 
recovery will depend largely on its ability to regain the confidence of domestic 
consumers and domestic and foreign investors. The crisis can be a catalyst for continuing 
the structural reforms to improve productivity and the business climate and fiscal reforms 
to strengthen the economy’s non-oil tax base. The way forward is diversification through 
greater openness, greater macroeconomic stability, more use of cutting-edge technology 
and knowhow, more foreign direct investments, and a stronger and healthier banking 
system. 
 
The third challenge is to continue the integration into the global economy, including 
the acceleration of accession to the WTO. Russia has benefited substantially from being 
more integrated with global markets. Indeed, integration of trade, capital, and finance has 
helped Russia reap important benefits during the past decade of rapid economic growth. 
A key source of investment and growth in the past years has been long-term equity and 
debt from foreign investors. The WTO accession can be used as a means towards locking 
in domestic reforms, ensuring that Russia benefits from a rules-based international 
trading regime, as well as to strengthen Russia’s future integration into the world 
economy by improving its policies and institutional capacity. Russia’s active 
participation in the design of the new international financial architecture will solidify its 
role in global financial markets. 
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The fourth challenge is to limit the impact of the crisis at the regional level and be 
vigilant to the emergence of non-payment problems. First, the credit crunch is likely to 
have a negative effect on regions that have relied on debt financing and narrow tax bases. 
Although aggregate sub-national debt levels including guarantees are very small for the 
economy as a whole (currently 527 billion rubles, or approximately 1.5 percent of GDP), 
the slowdown of economic growth and shortfall in tax revenues will put additional fiscal 
pressures. Furthermore, for regions that have relied on debt to cover its expenditure gap, 
the cost of borrowing is likely to increase. On October 7 the rating agency S&P 
downgraded the rating of Moscow oblast, the largest debt holder among Russian regions 
in absolute terms, four notches from BB to B-. Second, in an environment with more 
limited access to borrowing different sectors of economy once again risk an increase in 
non-payments. In addressing this potential problem, the authorities need to carefully 
weigh the implications of its policy mix. Although softening of budget constraint on the 
state owned companies (especially utilities) or introduction of administrative price 
controls might seem as an easy solution to minimize the negative social consequences of 
the economic slowdown, such policy will distort incentives for enterprises to restructure 
and use inputs and existing assets more efficiently. 
 
Finally, a prolonged economic slowdown into 2009 might require an introduction of a 
well targeted and structured, fiscal stimulus package to enhance key drivers of 
sustained economic growth. From the macroeconomic perspective, Russia may be a 
good candidate for such a fiscal stimulus as economic activity drops significantly below 
potential, inflation risks subside, and fiscal reserves remain comfortable. The objective 
would be to unlock investment and boost aggregate demand and create more favorable 
environment for a more rapid recovery of private investment and FDI. To have desired 
effect, however, such a fiscal stimulus (which could consist of a combination of spending 
increases and targeted tax cuts) must be temporary, transparent, affordable, and rule-
based and implemented as exceptional policy in an exceptional situation. This is 
important for governance reasons and for credibility of the authorities policy response 
discussed below. But it is also important to minimize the potential longer-term “moral 
hazard” and incentives problems that arise from state support for enterprises and banks 
that made inadequate commercial and borrowing decisions.   
 
Outlook for 2008-09 
 
The following outlook is based on key global assumptions of the World Bank’s Global 
Economic Prospects and Russia-specific information and assumptions. Given that the 
global financial outlook remains uncertain as the crisis continues to unfold in the Western 
countries that are implementing major policy packages, the outlook is especially 
uncertain both in terms of global demand and oil prices. Key global assumptions are 
current World Bank projections of oil prices in 2008 of about USD101.5 a barrel and in 
2009 of USD74.5 a barrel, and world growth slowing to 2.48 in 2008 and 0.93 percent in 
2009. Also, the Russia outlook is based on the impact on the economy so far and policy 
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responses thus far2. On that basis, this report projects real GDP growth for 2008 as a 
whole at about 6 percent (compared with 6.8 percent before the crisis began) and 3 
percent in 2009 (compared with 6.5 percent before the crisis). Most of the impact is 
concentrated in the last quarter of this year when economic activity is expected to slow to 
about 2 percent. Unemployment is expected to rise moderately to 5.9 percent (from 5.3 
percent) by year end, reflecting employment losses in labor intensive sectors such as 
construction, trade and services as well as the financial sector undergoing restructuring. 
 
Inflation outlook remains broadly unchanged for 2008 and somewhat higher for 2009.  
We project end-year 2008 inflation at about 13.5 percent, close to the upper end of our 
earlier estimate of 12-14 percent. This reflects opposing factors of slowing economy, 
credit crunch, and reversal of capital inflows and additional liquidity and public 
expenditures, which are likely to rise further. In 2009, reducing inflation below 12 
percent will be difficult, a mark that could be possible if the global financial crisis shows 
signs of easing towards the end of that year.  
 
Twin surpluses (federal fiscal and external current account) will substantially decline 
and capital account deficit would widen with further capital outflows. Federal fiscal 
surplus in 2008 would likely remain within 3.5 percent of GDP range but could decrease 
further in 2009, reflecting lower oil export revenues and additional public expenditures 
now under consideration. Current account surplus would be around USD100 billion in 
2008 and about USD40 billion in 2009. Capital account would deteriorate in 2008 to 
about USD50 billion and then to USD100 billion in 2009, largely reflecting the 
repayment obligations and the lack of large new FDIs or portfolio investments until the 
global crisis nears the end. The attendant impact on CBR reserves should be limited to a 
possible loss of no more than additional USD100 billion in 2009, including the 
announced policy interventions in support of the banking and corporate sectors. 
 
 
                                                 
2 To the extent these assumptions and policy responses are revised, the outlook for Russia discussed here 
will need to be revisited. 
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2. ANATOMY OF THE CRISIS 
 
A perfect storm––the US subprime mortgage and financial crises 
 
The origins of the current global financial crisis can be traced to the housing market 
collapse in the United States. After a period of prolonged low interest rates, the US 
Federal funds rate (interest rates at which a depository institution lends immediately 
available funds (balances at the Federal Reserve) to another depository institutions) rose 
sharply from 1 percent in 2004 to 5.25 percent in 2006, resulting in falling housing prices 
and rising homeowner defaults on mortgage. Particularly large defaults were recorded in 
the subprime mortgage segment—high risk loans to homeowners with poor or no credit 
histories. By early 2007, the subprime housing industry began to collapse, taking down 
with it US consumer incomes, employment, and confidence, traditionally the engine of 
the US economy.  
 
But the first signs of the global impact of escalating US sub-prime credit crisis were 
evident in August 2007. Credit markets worldwide tightened as subprime mortgage 
backed securities were discovered to have afflicted large segments of bank portfolios and 
hedge funds around the world. On 10 August 2007, central banks around the world made 
their first coordinated effort to ease the liquidity constraints. By the fall of 2007, major 
losses of the banking sector begin to emerge: UBS and Citibank, for example, wrote 
down billions of dollars in afflicted assets. In September 2007, a run on Northern Rock, a 
bank in the United Kingdom, resulted in the first direct, major international bailout by 
national authorities in that country. In March 2008, Bear Stearns, a major US investment 
bank, was bailed out by JP Morgan Chase.  
 
In this first phase of the global crisis, Russia was largely immune to the worsening of 
global financial markets. The impacts of the liquidity squeeze of August 2007 were 
short-lived, and after a short break, the Russian stock market kept on rising. Although 
Russia was the third largest holder of fixed income securities issued by government-
backed mortgage lenders in the United States, the Russian banking system did not have 
significant, direct exposure to subprime mortgage-backed securities.  And with the price 
of oil still high, investors around the world viewed Russia as a safe haven in a more 
turbulent global financial environment. So, despite tightening global credit markets, 
Russia remained a favorable destination for foreign capital, attracting a record inflow of 
capital and FDI in 2007. 
 
The global crisis reaches Russia—oil prices and the stock market collapse 
 
By mid-2008, the global financial crisis began to reach Russia on the back of a 
weakening and highly oil-dependent global economy. Rapidly deteriorating global 
conditions affected Russia in two fundamental ways. First, the tightening of global credit 
markets resulted in a liquidity crisis around the world, which hit emerging markets, all 
suffering massive losses. Second, the perceptions of a global economic slowdown led to a 
sharp decline in the price of oil, Russia’s main export. While these two factors were 
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dominant, the Russian financial markets reacted negatively to some domestic policy 
related news, further weakening investor confidence. Examples include the Mechel case 
on July 24 and the corporate dispute within TNK-BP. The August conflict in Georgia 
also took its one-time toll on the market. The worst financial crisis in Russia in a decade 
ensued. Between its peak on 19 May and November 7, 2008, the Russian stock market 
lost about two thirds of its value, equivalent of close to USD1 trillion (about 84 percent 
of Russia's 2007 GDP). Other emerging markets suffered similar losses in the same time 
period: China's CSI 300 index lost 57 percent and Brazil’s Bovespa stock index lost 50 
percent. Even the much wider US S&P index lost 35 percent, one of the worst bear 
markets in history. 
 
 
Box 2.1: Comparing the financial crises of 1998 and 2008 
 
Russia is facing its greatest financial crisis since the August 1998 debt moratorium and analysts have 
drawn similarities between 1998 and 2008 by looking at the stock market dynamics. The common 
denominator between 1998 and 2008 is one of the key triggers—namely the global economic slowdown 
and the decline in the price of oil—demonstrating the continued, high vulnerability of the Russian economy 
to fluctuations on the world markets. RTS index is now more dependent on changes in oil prices: the 
pairwise correlation between the RTS index and the price of oil increased from 0.6 in 1998 to 0.8 in 2008. 
As illustrated in figure 1, steep decreases in oil prices caused the RTS index to tumble by 90.3 percent in 
1998 and by 69 percent in 2008. In both cases, the RTS index lost 50 percent of its value only about 80 
days after it had peaked (figure 2). But this is where similarities stop. 
 
Box figure 1: Oil price and the Russian stock 
market, 1997-2008 
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Box figure 2: Comparing the RTS index in 1998 
and 2008 (daily prices as a % of the peak value) 
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Source: RTS and Thompson Datastream 
 
The duration, severity and impact of these crises are likely to vary due to the vastly different underlying 
vulnerabilities of the economy as well as policy responses. In 1998, Russia had fiscal deficits and 
mounting interest payments, high levels of public debt, weak growth prospects, and low reserves. 
Moreover, fiscal imbalances coupled with a fixed exchange rate band made an especially vulnerable policy 
mix. By contrast, in 2008, macroeconomic vulnerability was much lower due to two main factors. First, 
since 1998, Russia has implemented important reforms, prudently managed public finances, created 
sizeable stabilization fund and liberalized foreign exchange system. This contributed to the strengthening of 
the financial system and to the achievement of large fiscal and external account surpluses, and low levels of 
debt. In addition, the banking system today is much stronger and better supervised. Second, thanks to the 
high oil prices in the last decade, Russia now possesses the third largest foreign reserves in the world, 
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which provide a hefty buffer against shocks. As a result of these factors, Russia is now far better prepared 
to deal with the shocks arising from the world markets. 
 
Box table 1: Similar triggers but different context, 1998 versus 2008 
 1998 2008 
Triggers Asian financial crisis; 
Decline in oil prices; 
Inconsistencies between fiscal and 
exchange rate policies 
Global credit crisis; 
Decline in oil prices; 
Context Low external reserves; 
Weak fiscal position; 
Stock market played a small role in 
transmitting the impact of the crisis to the 
real economy; 
Barter and non-payments played a large 
role in the economy 
World’s third largest external reserves; 
Strong fiscal position; 
Stock market is now more vulnerable to changes 
in oil prices, and plays a larger role in 
transmitting the impact of the crisis to the real 
economy; 
The economy is now a “cash” economy and does 
not longer rely heavily on barter schemes 
 
The type of policy responses and costs of the crises also differ. In 1998, the government reacted by 
devaluating the ruble and defaulting on its debt obligations. By contrast, in 2008, the government 
responded swiftly by boosting liquidity, providing capital injections to the banking system, and ensuring 
the repayment of external obligations by banks and enterprises. These measures aimed to prevent a wave of 
panic selling amid fears of large losses. Regarding the parties bearing the costs of the crises, in 1998 the 
private sector assimilated most of the cost as a result of the policy response, whereas in 2008, the cost will 
mainly be assimilated by the public sector through substantial fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs.  
 
 
To analyze the financial crisis in Russia, we divide the present crisis into three phases: 
(1) the orderly decline phase; (2) the investor liquidity and confidence crisis phase; and 
(3) the ongoing and policy response phase. These phases proceed chronologically and 
capture the various impacts of key international and domestic factors on the Russian 
financial markets. 
Figure 2.1. Russian stock market and oil price dynamics during crisis 
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First phase: orderly decline  
 
The first phase began on May 19, the day the Russian stock market peaked, and ended 
on September 12. During this whole phase, there was a gradual decline in the RTS index, 
largely driven by international factors, mainly a worsening of global conditions and a 
decline in confidence in equity markets worldwide (table 2.1 and figure 2.1). At first, the 
drying up of global liquidity and investor confidence and the rapidly slowing US 
economy resulted in a fall in equity markets worldwide—as investors fled to quality amid 
fears of unknown future losses in the financial sector and the sense that the crisis has 
become truly global. From May 19 to July 3, both S&P and RTS indices fell by around 
11 percent. But after July 3, the prospects of the prolonged global economic slowdown 
triggered a rapid decline in oil prices from its peak at USD144.07 per barrel (Brent 
Crude—USD139.52 per barrel, Ural). The RTS index fell by around 38 percent from July 
3 to September 12, or slightly more than the fall in oil prices. During this phase, the 
pairwise correlation between the Russian stock market index and its fundamental 
variable––the oil price—reached an almost perfect 0.973 value. 
 
Table 2.1. Anatomy of the crisis: volatility in key market indicators (% change)  
  Dates RTS RTS* S&P 
500 
Oil 
price 
CDS (in 
basis 
points) 
Interbank 
rate (in 
basis 
points) 
Official 
reserves (in 
USD b) 
Phase 1: gradual meltdown 
 May 19-Jul 3 -11.1% -6.0% -11.5% 18.2% 23.60 -18.50 27.00 
 
Worsening global 
conditions…         
 Jul 4 - Sep 12 -38.7% -33.4% -0.89% -32.4% 53.20 195.50 -14.10 
 
…followed by a start of 
oil price decline         
 Jul 24-Aug 6 -12.2% -8.1% 2.9% -8.8% 0.80 1.00 5.20 
 
Policy news (Mechel 
case) dents investor 
confidence 
       
 
 Aug 8 - Aug 24 -6.5% -5.7% 0.9% 0.8% 20.00 80.50 -16.00 
 
Geopolitical tensions 
escalate (Georgia 
conflict)   
       
 
Phase 2: confidence crisis  
 Sep 15-Sep 18 -21.1% -10.7% -3.6% -5.5% 99.90 103.00 -0.90 
 
Liquidity freeze blocks 
the Russian interbank 
market  
       
  
Phase 3: aftermath and policy response 
 Sep 19-Sep 26 -0.8% -1.9% -3.3% 7.9% 33.40 -47.50 3.40 
 
Initial rescue package 
announced on September 
17 
       
 
 Sep 29 –
November 13 -48.1% -55.5% -17.7% -43.8% 512.5 966.50 -71.1 
 
Additional packages 
announced on September 
29 and October 14         
RTS* - average of RTS sectoral indices weighted by the share of the sectoral contribution to the GDP in 
2007. RTS indices for oil, mining and metals are combined (weighted by market capitalization).  
CDS: credit default swap spreads in basis points for a sovereign 5 year Russian government bond 
Interbank: Russian interbank lending rate for duration of 31 to 90 days 
Source: RTS, Thompson Datastream, Government of the Russian Federation, the World Bank. 
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With worsening global conditions, international investors began reassessing the 
attractiveness of the Russian market, and many investors, led by some large hedge 
funds, closed their positions in Russia. Russia was no longer viewed as a safe haven by 
equity investors. In the week of June 23-27, credit default swaps (CDSs) on Russia’s 
sovereign debts jumped by 30 basis points, a clear indication that foreign investor 
confidence worsened considerably. Some policy-related news during the week of July 25 
(the Mechel and TNK-BP cases) also shook confidence in domestic economic policy in 
the eyes of foreign investors, contributing to a fall of 8.6 percent in the RTS index during 
the following two weeks and yet another increase in the CDSs. Global liquidity 
constraints also affected the Russian interbank rates, which increased to about 18 percent 
in the week of June 20. The credit crunch triggered a rapid increase in margin calls in 
early July, which led to a further decline in the stock market. On top of these 
developments, on August 8, geopolitical tensions arising from the Georgia conflict 
became an additional international factor contributing to the jump in credit default swaps 
(an increase by 20 basis points) and to the decline in the RTS index (by 6.5 percent).  
 
During the first phase there were no major official announcements of policy measures 
specifically geared toward addressing the stock market crisis. Importantly, the decline in 
the stock market was contained within that part of the financial system. While some 
banks were facing large external repayments, no Russian bank had yet experienced 
repayment difficulties or an acute liquidity crisis that would warrant a strong policy 
response. A key policy change was that the Russian Central Bank began switching from 
exchange rate to inflation targeting, increasing exchange rate volatility and uncertainty 
about short-term exchange rate movements. Signs of tightening of liquidity became 
evident during September 8 when during the Ministry of Finance’s extraordinary deposit 
auction the demand for budget fund deposits by banks was 50 percent higher than supply. 
 
Second phase: the liquidity and confidence crisis in mid-September 
 
The second phase marks the peak of the liquidity and confidence crisis caused mainly 
by the Lehman Brothers filing for bankruptcy and the bailout of AIG, the world’s 
largest insurer. With hindsight, these events were a turning point that moved the global 
financial crisis into a panic. World markets reacted very negatively with massive daily 
drops. In Russia, these events, carefully watched by all market players, triggered a virtual 
freeze of the interbank market during the week of September 15-19. In just a few days, 
interbank lending rates jumped by 100 basis points, but the interbank money market 
remained dysfunctional. While the overall liquidity in the system was not at critical levels 
and, in fact, began to improve toward the end of this episode in late September, the 
transfer of liquidity from a few large banks to the second and third tier banks stalled 
partly because of the fear of escalating counterparty risk. The equity market experienced 
a sharp increase in selloffs fuelled by massive margin calls as investors cashed in their 
rapidly dwindling equity positions. On September 15-16, the Ministry of Finance doubled 
the total limit of budget funds available over deposit auctions and increased the daily 
limits for such auctions, followed by CBR’s increase in daily limits for REPO operations 
on September 17; however, this coordinated effort turned out to be not sufficient to stem 
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the fear in the market. On September 17, the Federal Financial Markets Service closed 
the exchanges for two days to prevent a wave of panic-selling amid fears of large losses. 
The announcement of massive policy response by the authorities on September 17 
resulted in a bounce back of the market on Friday, September 19, recouping all the losses 
of this tumultuous week. 
 
Third phase: Swift and massive policy response 
 
The stock market meltdown and a clear sense that global crisis had moved to a panic 
prompted the Russian authorities to respond with quick and massive policy measures. 
The authorities reversed the earlier policy of gradual monetary policy tightening and 
committed substantial fiscal resources to shore up the banking system and ensure 
liquidity in financial markets. Given the shifting balance of risk from inflation to the 
banking system and the real economy, the initial policy response was broadly timely and 
appropriate. The first set of policy measures announced on September 17 was aimed at 
injecting liquidity into the financial market (table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2. Policy measures announced during September 17-23, 2008 and their cost  
Policy measure Objectives 
 
Financing 
source 
Status and 
implementation 
mechanism 
Cost in billions 
(fiscal, quasi-fiscal, 
monetary) 
Monetary policy measures 
Increasing the amount 
of funds available 
through REPO 
Providing liquidity 
for the banking sector 
CBR Implemented 
immediately 
Monetary impact up 
to 430 billion (rubles) 
A cut in the reserve 
requirements a)  
Providing liquidity 
for the banking sector 
Reserves 
held at the 
CBR 
effective from 
September 18  
Monetary impact: 
300 billion (rubles)  
Fiscal policy measures 
A cut in the crude-
export duty b)  
Mitigate the impact 
of oil price decline 
for oil companies 
Lost tax 
revenues 
Effective October 1, 
2008 
Fiscal cost: 140 
billion (rubles) 
 
Increasing the grace 
period for VAT 
payments due in 
October 
Providing additional 
liquidity to private 
companies 
Tax credit October VAT 
payments are 
extended for 3 
months 
Quasi-fiscal: 
approximately 115 
billion rubles (3-
month credit) 
A capital injection 
into AHML (agency 
of home mortgage 
loans);  
Capitalize AHML Federal 
budget 
implemented Quasi-Fiscal cost: 60 
billion (rubles)  
 
A liquidity injection 
to the three largest 
state-controlled 
banks  
Providing liquidity 
for Sberbank, 
Gazprombank and 
VTB 
Federal 
budget 
Announced, but not 
implemented 
Quasi Fiscal cost: 60 
billion (rubles)  
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Policy measure Objectives 
 
Financing 
source 
Status and 
implementation 
mechanism 
Cost in billions 
(fiscal, quasi-fiscal, 
monetary) 
A temporary 
allocation of federal 
budget funds into the 
short-term (3 month) 
deposits at selected 
banks 
Providing liquidity 
for the banking sector 
Federal 
budget 
 Quasi-fiscal cost: up 
to 1,514 billion 
(rubles) 
 
A decrease in deposit 
insurance premium 
payments 
Providing liquidity to 
the banking sector 
Deposit 
insurance 
agency 
A decrease in 
transfer banks pay to 
the deposit insurance 
fund c) 
 
Administrative 
A ban on short-
selling of stocks 
Limiting large price 
fluctuations on the 
stock exchange 
   
Temporary closure of 
stock exchanges 
(MICEX and RTS) 
Limiting large price 
fluctuations on the 
stock exchange 
 Regulators from the 
Federal Financial 
Markets Service 
have repeatedly 
suspended trading 
 
a. By four percentage points to 1.5 percent on household deposits, 4.5 percent on liabilities to non-
residents, and 2.0 percent on other liabilities. 
b. From USD495.90 to USD372 per ton. 
c. from 0.13 to 0.1 percent starting from the fourth quarter of 2008 
Sources: Economic Expert Group and World Bank daily monitoring of the macro and financial indicators. 
 
Because some announced liquidity measures were not immediately implemented or did 
not have the desired effect, liquidity conditions had remained very tight. This was 
especially the case for secondary banks and highly leveraged sectors and enterprises 
(construction, retail, agriculture). The liquidity injection into the large state-owned banks, 
for example, did not trickle down to the banking system. The segmented interbank 
market prevented the liquidity from moving beyond a few large market players because 
fear of counterparty risk dominated market sentiment. And the demand for temporary 
allocation of federal funds remained weak since the banks that did qualify for these 
deposits, mainly the largest banks, continued to rely on the daily REPO facility to access 
the liquidity.  
 
The second set of policy measures announced on September 29 and October 14 was 
aimed at addressing the more systemic risks of the banking sector. Government-
orchestrated bailouts targeted USD5 billion capital injections in Svyaz bank, Globex 
bank, Sobinbank (CBR injected USD2.5 billion in Svyaz bank and USD2 billion in 
Globex bank via VEB, and additional USD0.5 billion in Sobinbank via 
Gazenergoprombank). To strengthen the confidence of deposit holders, the government 
increased deposit insurance coverage to 700,000 rubles (about USD28,000) and injected 
additional capital into the federal deposit insurance agency. CBR was allowed to place a 
USD50 billion deposit at the VEB bank to reduce the rollover risk of short-term external 
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debt held by domestic financial and non-financial corporations. The government also 
announced a plan to provide long-term financing in subordinated debt of around 950 
billion rubles (USD35.4 billion). Most of this long-term finance was earmarked for three 
state owned banks - Sberbank, VTB, Rosselkhozbank could be eligible for up to 725 
billion rubles.  
 
Table 2.3. Policy measures announced on September 29 and October 14 2008 and 
their cost  
Policy measure Objectives 
 
Financing 
source 
Status and 
implementation 
mechanism 
Cost in billions 
(fiscal, quasi-fiscal, 
monetary) 
Monetary policy 
CBR will be allowed to 
partially compensate the 
losses of a bank lender, if a 
financial organization, the 
recipient of the loan, fails 
to repay the loan. 
Providing liquidity 
for the banking 
sector, especially 
second-tier banks 
CBR Temporary measure 
effective until 
December 31, 2009 
Unspecified quasi 
fiscal cost 
Additional cut in reserve 
requirements 
Providing liquidity 
for the banking sector 
Reserves 
held at the 
CBR 
Effective 
immediately until 
early 2009 
Monetary impact: 
100 billion (rubles) 
The CBR will be allowed 
to lend (short-term) without 
collateral 
Providing liquidity 
for the banking 
sector, especially 
second-tier banks 
CBR Legislation approved Unspecified quasi 
fiscal cost 
The CBR will deposit 
USD50bn with 
Vnesheconombank (VEB) 
to replace foreign funding 
to those entities which 
cannot refinance existing 
debt abroad. 
Reducing rollover 
risk of short-term 
external debt of 
domestic financial 
and non-financial 
corporations 
Foreign 
exchange 
reserves 
of CBR 
The CBR will 
deposit USD50bn 
with 
Vnesheconombank 
(VEB) to replace 
foreign funding to 
those entities which 
cannot refinance 
existing debt abroad. 
Quasi-fiscal:  
1,300 billion 
(rubles)  
51.18 billion (USD) 
The government and CBR 
will provide RUB950bn 
(USD36bn) in subordinated 
debt  
Providing liquidity 
for the banking sector 
CBR 500 
billion, 
National 
welfare 
fund 
deposits 
of 450 
billion 
Subordinated credits 
up to 2020, interest 
rate 8%, Sberbank 
up to 500 billion 
rubles, VTB up to 
200b rubles, 
Rosslekhozbank up 
to 25b rubles. 
 
Quasi-fiscal  
950 billion (rubles) 
37.40 billion (usd) 
Introduction of daily limits 
on currency-swap 
operations 
Limiting currency 
speculation 
 The CBR will 
announce a limit on 
traders' currency-
swap operations 
daily by 10 a.m. in 
Moscow 
None 
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Policy measure Objectives 
 
Financing 
source 
Status and 
implementation 
mechanism 
Cost in billions 
(fiscal, quasi-fiscal, 
monetary) 
Fiscal policy 
Recapitalization of Deposit 
Insurance Agency 
Strengthening the 
confidence in the 
banking system 
Federal 
budget 
 Quasi-fiscal cost: 
200 billion (rubles) 
Support for financial 
markets 
Provide support for 
companies traded on 
stock market 
Federal 
budget via 
National 
welfare 
fund 
deposits 
in VEB 
Using public funds 
to purchase equities 
and bonds of 
companies, assets 
will be purchased via 
VEB 
Quasi-fiscal: 175 
billion (rubles) in 
2008, 175 billion 
(rubles in 2009): 
350 billion (rubles) 
total 
Recapitalization of VEB Strengthening the 
banking system 
Federal 
budget 
 Quasi-fiscal cost:  
75 billion (rubles) 
An additional cut in the 
crude-export duty a) 
 
Mitigate the impact 
of oil price decline 
for oil companies 
lost tax 
revenues 
effective November 
1, 2008 
Fiscal cost: 50 
billion (rubles) 
 
a) from USD372 per ton to USD287.30 per ton 
Sources: Economic Expert Group; announcements of the Government of the Russian Federation; and 
World Bank daily monitoring of macro and financial indicators in Russia. 
 
As a result of these monetary, fiscal, and quasi-fiscal measures, the authorities in 
Russia will affect both short-term and long-term interest rates. Having a direct control 
of both short-term and long-term interest rates raises important issue of indeterminacy, 
especially if long-term rates were not to accurately reflect market expectations about the 
future path of interest rates. This could undermine the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
the medium term, especially with interest rates increasingly important in combating 
inflation in the aftermath of the crisis. 
 
The impact of the second set of policy measures on equity markets was limited, 
however, against the backdrop of a further decline in the oil price and a panic in world 
markets. RTS index fell by an additional 48 percent from September 29 to November 13, 
and the oil price by 43 percent.  
 
On November 7, the government announced a new plan for a broad set of policies to 
address the impact of crisis on real economy. The plan includes 55 tasks categorized in 
10 blocks covering a wide span of economic sectors, including, agriculture, 
manufacturing and real estate. Although the plan includes examples of good policy 
proposals, such as instruments to support small and medium business, the plan focuses on 
short-term measures that are vaguely defined and would require additional loosing of 
monetary and fiscal policy. In addition, the plan includes some protectionist and 
administrative measures that result in a preferential treatment for select market 
participants. These measures will likely be made more concrete in the months ahead and 
their implementation will be important to monitor and adjust as needed as the crisis 
evolves in the real economy. 
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The impact of the financial crisis: fiscal and monetary growth and poverty 
 
The impact of global financial crisis on Russia will continue to be felt on several fronts 
in the remainder of 2008 and 2009. The final outcome will depend on the rather 
uncertain global economic outlook, including the price of oil and the continuing 
soundness of the policy responses. But some immediate effects can be estimated with 
some certainty.  
 
• First, there is a wealth effect, from a loss of about USD1 trillion (about 84 percent 
of Russia’s 2007 GDP) of Russian stock market capitalization in the short period 
from May 19 to November 7, 2008. Of this amount, Russia’s wealthy individuals 
have reportedly lost about USD300 billion in paper value. The remainder was lost 
to large state owned oil and gas and related companies and some limited stock 
ownership by the middle class. Even so, the wealth effect is large enough that it is 
bound to affect aggregate consumption, compounded by tighter borrowing 
conditions and access to credit. 
 
• Second, global and domestic liquidity constraints will result in a notable growth 
slowdown in Russia with attendant losses in real incomes and employment and a 
rise in poverty. Investment in the fourth quarter of 2008 is likely to stall due to 
increases in borrowing costs and possible access problems and to heightened 
uncertainty and its impact on domestic and foreign investor confidence. An 
increase in borrowing costs will slow consumer demand. Several non-tradable 
industries, notably construction and trade, are especially vulnerable to a fall in 
aggregate demand. This economic report estimates the GDP growth in 2008 will 
be in the 6 percent range and in 2009 about 3 percent. This compares with the 
earlier, mid-year estimate of 6.8 percent for 2008 and 6.5 percent for 2009. The 
difference between these estimated growth rates “before” and “after” the crisis 
reflects the impact of growth slowdown. The relatively moderate slowdown in 
2008 relative to earlier forecasts reflects the fact that the Russian economy 
continued to grow at about 7.5 percent through the first three quarters of 2008, so 
the impact of the crisis this year will be felt largely in the last quarter.  
 
• Third, the growth slowdown will affect real incomes of the middle class and of 
the poor. This adds the human dimension of what began as a financial crisis, 
calling for an estimate of the social impact of the crisis and a formulation of 
appropriate policy response (see box 2.2). 
 
Box 2.2: Impact of the financial crisis on Russia’s poor 
 
Over the past eight years, Russia’s robust growth has reduced poverty. Real GDP per capita grew on 
average by about 7 percent a year between 2000 and 2007. Meanwhile, the poverty headcount rate declined 
from 29 percent in 2000 to 13.4 percent in 2007. This implies that approximately 30 million people 
appeared to have moved out of poverty during 2000–07. 
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Box figure 1: Projected poverty headcount rates for 2008 and 2009 
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Source: World Bank staff calculations 
 
The implications of the financial crisis on Russia’s poor are troubling. Figures 1 and 2 show the 
projected impact of the financial crisis on Russia’s poor using Rosstat’s 2006 household budget survey. 
Projections of future changes in poverty rates are based on two scenarios: (1) a “before the crisis” scenario, 
where we assume that real GDP per capita would growth at 6.8 percent in 2008 and 6.5 percent in 2009; 
and (2) an “after the crisis” scenario, where we predict a slowdown in per capita growth due to the ongoing 
financial crisis, resulting in a GDP per capita growth rate of 6.5 percent in 2008 and 3.5 percent in 2009.  
 
If the high growth rates of the 2000–07 period had continued in the next two years (i.e. in the “before the 
crisis” scenario), our projections suggest that the poverty headcount rate would have declined by 10.2 
percent in 2008 and 8.6 percent in 2009. In other words, the poverty headcount would have declined by 
almost one-third between 2007 and 2009. Yet, the likely growth slowdown from the ongoing financial 
crisis will dampen this otherwise rapid progress. In an “after the crisis” scenario, currently viewed as a 
“baseline”, the projected poverty headcount rates would increase to 10.4 percent in 2008 and to 9.5 percent 
in 2009. The higher poverty headcount rates imply that about 1.3 million fewer people will move out of 
poverty between 2007 and 2009.  
 
International experience and good practice suggest that the government could soften the impact of the 
financial crisis on the poor. The ongoing financial crisis emphasizes having a strong social protection and 
assistance system, which could be scaled up in times of need. The most important income transfer in Russia 
is pensions, and other non-contributory social assistance transfers for the poor are small. In addition, social 
protection expenditures in Russia have been mainly pro-cyclical, while targeting performance in the biggest 
two programs benefiting the poor (the child allowance and the decentralized social assistance programs) is 
fairly low. Policy recommendations to soften the impact of the crisis on the poor are, in this order: (1) 
reallocate untargeted, regressive privileges toward targeted social assistance programs; (2) strengthen the 
system of decentralized social spending through improved financing and better targeting of instruments; 
and (3) improve the targeting performance of those social programs targeted to the lowest quintiles (such as 
the child allowance program). 
 
 
Some of the economic slowdown represents a welcome cooling of an overheated 
economy and will also help reduce inflation from the current high levels. But as a result 
of significant relaxing of monetary policy to address the liquidity crisis (relaxation of 
reserve requirements alone injects 400 billion rubles), inflation pressures will persist in 
2009. And some depreciation of the ruble will feed into the CPI inflation. 
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Although the direct fiscal costs of the announced measures are manageable, quasi-
fiscal costs are much larger. Estimated direct fiscal costs are only 190 billion rubles 
(USD7.6 billion or about 0.58 percent of Russia’s GDP in 2007) but the quasi-fiscal and 
contingent costs could reach up to about 4,639 billion rubles (USD185 billion, or about 
14.7 percent of Russia’s GDP in 2007). These additional commitments have significantly 
reduced the fiscal space and halted many important initiatives, especially large capital 
expenditures to address infrastructure bottlenecks that might be scaled down or 
postponed. In the worst case, if the price of oil continues to decline toward the long-term 
average of about USD30––something not envisaged by most analysts at this time––
significant revisions in medium-term expenditure plans will be required.  
 
Table 2.4: Aggregate fiscal, quasi-fiscal and monetary cost and sources of financing 
of anti-crisis policy measures (in billions of rubles, unless otherwise indicated) 
 Fiscal Quasi-fiscal Monetary Total 
Federal Budget 190 up to 2,839  up to 3,029 
..o/w National 
Welfare Fund 
 up to 700  up to 700 
Central Bank 
of Russia 
 up to 1,800 830 up to 2,630 
Total (in bln 
rubles) 
190 up to 4,639 830 up to 5,659 
Total (in bln 
USD) 
7.6 up to 185.0 33.0 up to 225.6 
Source: World Bank staff estimates. 
 
The effects of the crisis will change the Russian banking sector, already triggering the 
consolidation of banks. The loan-deposit ratio of the Russian banking system increased 
from around 105 percent in 2005 to more than 125 percent in the first months of 2008 
(figure 2.2), reflecting greater reliance of banks on foreign borrowing as a source of 
funding. Although the aggregate ratio is high, it is not as high as in many CIS countries in 
a much more vulnerable position. But large external borrowings in Russia have put 
pressure on some small and medium banks, which in the absence of borrowing and 
refinancing options, have no other significant and stable sources of funding (such as 
deposits). Larger banks, including private ones, are generally in a stronger position to 
weather the financial turmoil.  
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Figure 2.2: Evolution of the loan-deposit ratio 
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Source: CBR. 
 
More broadly, some banks and corporations may have to revisit their business models. 
Banks who relied excessively on external borrowing as a mode of funding will need to 
revisit their business model and, as in other countries, move towards more traditional 
banking business and funding model relying on more stable and diversified deposit/client 
base. Also, given the ongoing, massive margin calls to private corporations on loans 
collateralized by volatile equity shares, corporate borrowing strategies as a business 
model should also be revisited. 
 
After a prolonged period of rapid real estate price increases fueled by high liquidity, 
the adjustment has started in select segments of the real estate sector, most notably in 
Moscow city. According to data from realmarket.ru, the average price of one square 
meter of an apartment in Moscow has increased on average by 35 percent annually in 
period from 2004 to the peak in August 2008. In October, the prices fell by around 5 
percent comparing to previous month. A slowdown in the real estate sector will not be 
limited to the construction industry, but would have wider implications, including the 
banking sector, a provider of mortgage lending and other lending instruments 
collateralized with property. 
 
In sum, the global crisis has affected Russia but the Government has so far responded 
in a pro-active and comprehensive manner. A lot more may need to be done to 
implement these measures. Transparency and effectiveness of such policy response is key 
to ensure that they limit the impact on the real economy. Attention will also need to be 
paid to longer-term issues of competitiveness, diversification, and growth of small- and 
medium- sized enterprises. Such reforms and modernization of the banking sector will 
lead to improvements in productivity and will help Russia emerge from the current crisis 
with a healthier and more dynamic economy.  
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3. LOW ENERGY EFFICIENCY AFFECTS RUSSIA’S ECONOMY 
AND REQUIRES GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION3 
 
Benefits from making Russian economy more efficient in energy use can amount to 
USD120-150 billion per year. The amount of energy released from greater efficiency can 
cover the increased demand for energy until 2020 at one third of the cost of building new 
generation capacity. Most barriers to energy efficiency are regulatory and informational, 
requiring active government intervention.  
 
Russia consumes more energy per unit of GDP than any of the world’s 10 largest energy 
consuming countries. In 2005, its energy consumption was 12th of 121 countries in 
kilograms of oil equivalent (kgoe) per US dollar of the country’s GDP (figure 3.1). High 
energy intensity brings about many challenges for the Russian economy and places a 
heavy burden on society. A recent report by the World Bank Group, Energy Efficiency in 
Russia: Untapped Reserves, assessed Russia’s potential energy savings at roughly 300 
million tons of oil per year, or 45 percent of its primary energy consumption. This 
potential saving is equivalent to all energy produced and imported (net of exports) by 
France or the United Kingdom, and to 2 percent of all energy produced in the world in 
2005. This chapter analyzes the roots of slow progress in tapping this potential and 
recommends policy action for change.  
 
The slow decline in Russia’s energy intensity is no longer sustainable without major 
cost to the economy. Russia’s energy intensity has fallen by 3.4 percent a year since 
1990, while most former Soviet Republics achieved 6-7 percent average annual 
reductions. The improvement in Russia was driven primarily by a shift toward less 
energy-intensive industries and increased industrial capacity utilization. Since most major 
industries were already approaching full capacity as early as 2006, this will not be a 
major driver for reducing energy intensity in the future. 
                                                 
3 This is a resume of the recent World Bank/IFC report Energy Efficiency in Russia: Untapped Reserves, 
September, 2008, website: http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/rsefp.nsf/Content/Materials  
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Figure 3.1. Energy intensity per dollar of GDP (PPP) 
 
Source: Energy consumption data from the International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy 
Balances data set. GDP and PPP conversion factor data from the World Bank 
Development Indicators Database.  
 
Russia’s energy intensity cannot be fully accounted for by natural causes or industry 
structure. With the world’s largest land mass, centers of population in some of the 
coldest areas on earth, the world’s 10th largest economy, and a predominance of heavy 
industry, Russia will be at the higher end of any international ranking of energy intensity. 
Together, however, these factors fail to explain all of Russia’s energy intensity. Russia 
remains more energy intensive than international comparisons would suggest for 
countries with its income, land mass, temperatures, and industry structures. At least some 
of Russia’s energy consumption is due to factors other than income, size, temperature, 
and industry structure (figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2. Weight of various factors in determining Russia’s energy intensity 
 
Source: Based on econometric analyses by the study team and subjective expert 
assessments. The following datasets were used: Energy consumption data from the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Balances data set. GDP and PPP conversion 
factor data from the World Bank Development Indicators Database. Temperature data 
from data set TYN CY 1.1, Mitchell, Carter, Jones, Hulme, and New, 2003: “A 
comprehensive set of high-resolution grids of monthly climate for Europe and the globe: 
the observed record (1901-2000) and 16 scenarios (2001-2100).” Journal of Climate, 
submitted. Gross value added data (by sector) from UNDP National Accounts dataset.  
 
The greatest potential for saving energy is in final consumption. The largest reductions in end-
use energy consumption are achievable in residential energy consumption (53.4 mtoe), electricity 
generation (44.4 mtoe), manufacturing (41.5 mtoe), transport (38.3 mtoe), and heat supply 
systems (31.2 mtoe).  
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Figure 3.3: Energy efficiency potential, by sector, and the multiplier effect 
 
Note: The study uses the definition of technically viable potential, economically viable 
potential and financially viable potential. For details please see Energy Efficiency in 
Russia: Untapped Reserves, Annex B. 
Source: CENEf for the World Bank. Statistical data on the economic and financial 
viability of fuel production and transformation and gas flaring is currently unavailable. 
 
The challenges of high energy intensity 
 
Russia’s natural gas supply obligations are at risk.  Some experts, including the 
International Energy Agency (IEA), have forecast that the Russian gas supply could, 
without significant additional upstream investment, fall short of projected domestic and 
export demand within the next few years. Russia may face the uncomfortable choice of 
using its gas to serve either domestic or export markets. Russia’s gas production is only 
slightly higher than it was in 1990. In contrast, domestic gas consumption, having grown 
at 1.7 percent a year between 1999 and 2006, is now growing at 2.5 percent, despite a 
quadrupling in the domestic tariff for natural gas. 
 
European natural gas import demand, meanwhile, is expected to continue to climb 
rapidly, from roughly 500 billion cubic meters to 800 billion cubic meters by 2030. As 
domestic supply falls, Europe will need to import a much larger percentage of the natural 
gas it uses. The inability to guarantee sufficient supplies was demonstrated in mid-
February 2006 when Russia unexpectedly cut gas deliveries to Serbia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Italy, Romania, and Poland, due to a lack of available gas. To the 
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extent that Russia’s supply constraints continue to leave it unable to meet these growing 
supply needs, Europe will look elsewhere to serve its gas supply needs reliably. 
 
Demand for electricity outpaces supply. Russia needs to add a minimum of 20,000 MW 
of new generating capacity over the next two to four years to meet growing electricity 
demand. The country will not come anywhere near this goal, having added only 1,000-
2,000 MW a year recently. Electricity consumption has been increasing at roughly 2-4 
percent a year, but supply has failed to keep pace, with Russia importing roughly 200-800 
MWh a month from Ukraine as of late 2006. Finland, importing electricity from Russia 
for years, is now preparing to reverse the electricity flow and become a net exporter to 
Russia rather than a net importer.  
 
Oil production comes short of meeting the growing demand. The Russian government 
has acknowledged that Russian oil production has stagnated, and oil exports are largely 
believed to be nearing a plateau. A top energy executive for Russia’s largest independent 
oil company believes that Russia’s oil production has already peaked and may never 
return to its current level. Meanwhile domestic demand for petroleum products continues 
to increase at a robust rate. The IEA expects crude output to decline as early as 2010. 
Other sources believe that crude production may already be declining.  
 
Russia’s energy intensity is a burden for industries driving the Russian economy. 
Russian companies currently share in one of the world’s largest energy subsidies, roughly 
USD40 billion a year. The Russian government recognizes the need to raise domestic 
electricity and gas prices to reflect the actual long-run cost of meeting demand, 
maintaining reliability, and operating and maintaining those assets. The government has 
been gradually increasing natural gas and electricity tariffs, and plans to continue to do 
so. Growth in energy tariffs will increase costs and reduce the profitability of industrial 
enterprises. Companies will either accept a decline in profitability—some of them 
possibly going out of business—or increase prices for their goods and services. Both 
options hurt their competitive position. Estimates from the Center for Macroeconomic 
Analysis and Short-term Planning indicate that from 2007 to 2010 growth in energy costs 
will translate into a 15 percent reduction in profits (3-7 percent on an annual basis). For 
some industries, profits may decline more than 25 percent.  
 
Government expenditure on energy has increased significantly since 2000. Federal 
budget funding for energy services increased from USD1.14 billion in 2000 to USD2.96 
billion in 2005 and USD3.81 billion in 2006, a three-fold increase. Of the USD2.96 
billion spent in 2005, USD1 billion paid for electricity supply, USD727 million paid for 
heating, USD131 million paid for gas consumption, and USD178 million for 
consumption of other fuels for boilers. Total government budget spending on energy 
supply and maintenance, including regional and municipal budgets, amounts to USD12.7 
billion, or 1 percent of Russia’s GDP. 
 
Russia sacrifices export revenue for every 1,000 cubic meters of gas demand that it 
cannot serve. The Russian government currently loses income for every 1,000 cubic 
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meters of gas wasted in inefficient electricity production, lost in transmission and 
distribution, flared at oil wells, or lost through inefficient use by households. Russia 
could earn an additional USD84-112 billion in export revenues every year by reaching its 
technical energy efficiency potential. This figure is equal to roughly 5 percent of Russia’s 
2006 GDP. Oil and gas exports together currently contribute to roughly 20 percent of 
Russian GDP.  
 
Environmental consequences of high energy intensity put Russian health at risk. A 
handful of pollutants linked to fossil fuel combustion, primarily PM10, SO2, and NOx, 
are responsible for 90 percent of human health risks from air pollution in Russia. These 
health risks, which increase rates of premature mortality, include respiratory illnesses, 
cardiovascular disease, increased prevalence of chronic bronchitis, and upper and lower 
respiratory tract infections. One study, based on 1993 and 1998 Rosgidromet data for 178 
Russian cities, estimated that 219-233,000 premature deaths, or 15-17 percent of the total 
in Russian towns, might be due to air pollution. These are aggregated numbers, and 
pollution-related mortality rates in towns with the highest level in air pollution are 
believed to be much higher. Another study estimated that for 1999, the mortality rate 
linked to air pollution was 44 persons per 100,000. Furthermore, an estimated 30 persons 
per 1,000 were likely to get sick due to air pollution. 
 
Benefits of energy efficiency in addressing the challenges 
 
Energy efficiency saving represents one-third the cost of building new energy supply 
facilities, and can be implemented more quickly. Achieving Russia’s full energy 
efficiency potential would cost the economy USD320 billion and result in annual costs 
savings to investors and end-users of about USD80 billion, paying it back in just four 
years.4 By realizing its energy efficiency potential, Russia can save 240 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas, 340 billion kWh of electricity, 89 million tons of coal, and 43 
million tons of crude oil and equivalents in refined petroleum products. The forecast 
shortfall of natural gas production (35-100 billion cubic meters by 2010) and the potential 
gap in additional electrical generation capacity (~20,000 MW) can be met by energy 
resources released through increased efficiency (240 billion cubic meters of gas and 
~43,000 MW of electricity capacity). Russia would require investments of more than 
USD1 trillion to construct energy supply facilities to generate the same amount of energy. 
Energy efficiency can achieve the same effect at one-third of the cost. 
 
Energy efficiency mitigates the risks and costs to Russia’s economy. It does this by 
helping to: 
• Maintain competitiveness: Enterprises can maintain their competitive 
position only by increasing labor and energy resource productivity. Industrial 
equipment modernization projects, witnessed by the World Bank Group, boosted 
the energy efficiency of production and reduced specific energy consumption by 
40-70 percent. Observed energy efficiency improvements have translated into a 5-
7 percent profit increase, even for non-energy intensive industries. 
                                                 
4 In 2007 internal prices. 
 
 
World Bank Russia Country Office                                                                                           Economic Management and Policy Unit 
 
43/45 
• Increase oil and gas export earnings: Russia’s energy intensity has a cost of 
USD84-112 billion a year in forgone export revenues. 
• Lower budget expenditures: USD3-5 billion can be saved annually from 
federal and local budgets by eliminating the inefficient use of energy. 
• Reduce environmental costs: By ignoring the consequences of emissions 
caused by its energy intensity, Russia sacrifices the health and welfare of its 
citizens and roughly USD10 billion a year in direct economic benefit from selling 
CO2 emissions reduction units. 
• Avoid becoming a CO2 buyer: If its energy efficiency potential was to be fully  
realized, Russia’s CO2 emissions in 2030 would be about 20 percent below the 
1990 level. Russia’s energy efficiency potential translates into a CO2 emissions 
reduction of 793 million tons of CO2 equivalent per year (about half of 2005 
emissions). This will not only address the challenge of climate change. It will also 
improve Russia’s international image and help it reemerge as a leader in 
addressing global environmental issues. 
 
Shaping an effective policy agenda to achieve energy efficiency 
 
Achieving greater energy efficiency requires that many individual decision makers 
gain comfort in investing their capital in projects to use energy more rationally. The 
government can provide that comfort by removing barriers, establishing clear conditions 
and standards, and supplying critical information. By creating a “pro-energy efficiency” 
business environment, it can catalyze significant investment flows. 
 
Roughly half of Russia’s potential energy savings can already be achieved through 
financially viable investments. Yet even financially viable investments have slow uptake. 
For example, in the manufacturing sector, 80 percent of energy efficiency potential is 
financially attractive, but few companies take advantage of all the opportunities. 
 
Current federal and regional legislation on energy efficiency is largely declarative. It 
does not address key barriers, such as the lack of information and access to long-term 
funding. Measures to remove these barriers and stimulate uptake of financially viable 
energy-efficiency projects are essential to realizing Russia’s energy efficiency potential 
and avoiding the consequences of continued high-energy intensity at higher tariffs. 
 
An energy efficiency champion is a prerequisite for successful policy implementation. 
Dedicated government agencies for energy efficiency have become a common way to 
coordinate government action on energy efficiency. At the federal level in Russia, the 
responsibility for energy efficiency policy has been moving from one agency to another, 
resulting in a general lack of ownership of the agenda. The late 1990s saw several good-
faith attempts to raise the profile of energy efficiency, but Russia’s energy efficiency 
policy is once again fragmented and lacking clear ownership. Russia may want to 
consider designating an energy efficiency champion, which may include creating a 
separate office of energy efficiency. 
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Systematic and comprehensive data gathering is crucial to the adoption of energy 
efficient practices and investments. The statistics office and line ministries need to 
develop uniform and user-friendly methods for recording, reporting, and aggregating 
individual, firm, sector, and regional data on energy production and consumption. Local 
government can facilitate and manage more detailed data gathering. This information is 
vital in developing benchmarking and best practices guidelines to demonstrate the 
potential benefits of energy efficiency investments to end-users.  
 
Information dissemination is critical. Individual households, companies, and public 
organizations need to be equipped with the knowhow and provided the expertise to carry 
out energy efficiency investments. In addition, information dissemination can raise 
general public awareness and acceptance of energy efficiency practices and socially 
beneficial decisions. Information dissemination campaigns can come in multiple forms, 
but need to be tailored to the end-user to be effective. Such campaigns can include 
advertising campaigns on energy efficiency, energy labeling of appliances and 
equipment, advice on equipment and behavioral practices, education at schools, and 
interactive expert advice through audits. Such campaigns are often funded with 
government support.  
 
Higher energy costs are making the benefits of energy efficiency more compelling—
and the consequences of inaction more painful—than ever before. To realize its energy 
efficiency potential, Russia needs a robust and comprehensive energy efficiency policy. 
The Russian government needs to face the challenge and focus on changing the attitudes 
and behaviors of diverse entities and individuals. The starting point is to create and fund 
an “energy efficiency champion” empowered to formulate and implement the energy 
efficiency agenda. This will enable the government to provide effective leadership to 
remove both general and sector-specific barriers, and create a framework conducive to 
public and private investment in energy efficiency improvements. 
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Annex: Main macroeconomic indicators 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Yr Yr Yr Yr Yr Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep
GDP, % change, y-o-y 1/ 5.1 4.7 7.3 7.2 6.4 7.4 8.1 - - 8.5 - - 8.0 - -
Industrial production, % change, y-o-y 4.9 3.1 8.9 8.0 5.1 6.3 6.3 4.5 7.5 6.5 9.2 6.7 0.9 3.2 4.7 6.3
Manufacturing, % change, y-o-y - 1.1 10.3 10.5 7.6 8.3 9.5 4.0 11.2 10.4 14.5 10.0 0.6 4.6 6.5 8.2
Extraction of mineral resources, % change, y-o-y - 6.8 8.7 6.8 1.4 2.5 1.9 0.6 2.3 -0.7 0.4 0.1 0.6 -1.8 0.7 3.2
Fixed capital investment, % change, y-o-y 10.0 2.8 12.5 13.7 10.9 16.7 21.1 19.0 21.1 20.1 20.3 15.3 8.7 9.9 7.9 11.8
Federal government balance, % GDP  1/ 3.0 1.4 1.7 4.3 7.5 7.4 5.5 10.4 8.2 7.2 9.0 8.2 7.1 9.2 8.7 8.1
Consolidated budget balance, % GDP 2/ - - 1.3 4.5 7.7 8.5 6.1 - - 12.1 - - 10.6 - - 11.1
M2, % change, p-o-p 3/ 44.6 34.1 44.8 42.5 35.6 43.6 51.3 -2.7 1.3 2.3 -0.3 2.8 3.8 -0.2 2.3 -1.1
Infla tion (CPI), % change, p-o-p 18.6 15.1 12.0 11.7 10.9 9.0 11.9 2.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.8
GDP deflator 1/ 16.5 15.7 14.0 20.1 19.2 15.7 13.5 - - 20.7 - - 22.1 - -
Producer price index (PPI),  % change, p-o-p 8.3 17.7 12.5 28.8 13.4 10.4 25.1 1.6 0.7 0.7 4.5 3.5 4.9 5.4 0.4 -5.0
Nominal exchange rate, average 29.2 31.4 30.7 28.8 28.3 27.1 25.6 24.5 24.5 23.8 23.5 23.7 23.6 23.4 24.1 25.3
Real effective exchange rate,  2000 = 100 (IMF) 120.3 123.6 127.3 137.3 149.3 163.4 172.7 179.9 179.5 181.5 184.1 184.6 186.0 188.4
Real effective exchange rate,  % change, p-o-p (IMF) 20.3 2.8 3.0 7.8 8.7 9.5 5.7 1.6 -0.2 1.1 1.4 0.3 0.7 1.3
Stabilization Fund bln USD, end-o-p - - - 18.7 42.9 89.1 156.8 157.4
Reserve Fund, bln USD e-o-p 127.8 130.5 129.8 129.3 130.3 129.7 142.6 141.0
National Wealth Fund, bln USD, e-o-p 32.2 32.9 32.7 32.6 32.9 32.7 31.9 48.7
Reserves (including gold) billion $, end-o-p 36.6 47.8 76.9 124.5 182.2 303.7 477.9 488.4 494.9 512.6 532.5 546.0 569.0 596.6 582.2 556.8
Trade Balance, billion $ 48.1 46.3 59.9 86.9 118.3 139.2 128.7 18.9 14.6 16.6 15.0 18.3 18.5 19.1 18.5 16.4
Share of energy resources in export of goods, % 51.2 52.4 54.2 54.7 61.1 63.3 61.5 - - 68.8 - - 67.1 66.9
Current Account, billion $ 33.9 29.1 35.4 58.6 84.2 95.6 76.6 - - 37.5 - - 26.2 - - 27.6
Export of goods, billion $ 101.9 107.3 135.9 183.2 243.6 303.9 354.0 34.5 35.7 40.0 40.3 42.8 44.0 47.8 45.6 43.8
Import of goods, billion $ 53.8 61.0 76.1 96.3 125.3 164.7 225.3 15.6 21.2 23.4 25.3 24.4 25.4 28.7 27.0 27.4
Gross FDI, mln USD 1/ 3980 4002 6781 9420 13072 13678 27797 - - 5585 - - 11080 - -
Average export price of Russia's oil,  $/bbl 20.9 21.0 23.9 34.1 45.2 56.2 64.4 84.3 84.7 91.0 95.8 105.0 114.5 122.0 112.0
Average weighted lending rate for enterprises, % 4/ 17.9 15.8 13.1 11.5 10.7 10.5 10.8 10.4 11.0 11.3 11.2 11.0 11.3 11.4 11.8
CBR refinancing rate, %, end-o-p 25.0 21.0 16.0 13.0 12.0 11.0 10.0 10.0 10.3 10.3 10.5 10.5 10.8 11.0 11.0 11.0
Real average rate for Ruble loans, % (deflated by PPI) -1.1 3.9 -2.2 -10.1 -8.4 -1.8 -3.4 -11.6 -11.8 -12.2 -12.4 -11.0 -12.8 -16.6 -14.9
Stock market index (RTS, ruble term) 260 359 567 614 1126 1922 2291 1907 2064 2054 2123 2460 2303 1967 1646 1212
Share of loss-making companies  1/ 38.4 43.4 41.3 35.8 33.5 29.7 23.4 34.3 33.0 34.3 33.3 31.3 29.4 29.4
Share of credits in capital investment  1/ - 10.8 14.5 15.2 13.8 14.3 15.5 - - 17.3 - - 17.2
Profitability (net profit/paid sales), % 1/ 25.6 17.4 20.7 25.5 25.3 25.6 36.8 58.0 39.1 32.1 32.5 34.3 36.7 35.2
Real disposable income, (1999 = 100%) 121.7 135.3 155.5 171.7 190.6 216.0 238.4 191.0 231.9 236.3 257.3 247.5 259.9 263.3 268.8 269.3
Average dollar wage, US $ 112.4 138.6 179.4 237.2 301.6 395.3 529.0 603.4 636.6 687.6 699.3 701.1 755.1 757.3 701.5 706.8
Share of people living below subsistence, % 1/ 27.5 24.6 20.3 17.6 17.7 15.2 13.4 - - - - - -
Unemployment (%, ILO definition) 9.0 8.0 8.6 8.2 7.6 7.2 6.1 6.6 7.1 6.5 6.6 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3
 1/  Cumulative from the year beginning
2/ Starting 2006 incl. ex trabudgetary  funds
3/ Annual change is calculated for average annual M2
4/ All terms up to one year
Source: Goskomstat, CBR, EEG, IMF, staff estimates.
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